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Abstract
This paper measures the relative importance of quality and quantity effects of corporate
taxation on foreign direct investment. Quantity is affected if corporate taxes reduce
the equilibrium stock of foreign capital in a given country. Quality effects arise if taxes
decrease the extent to which investment contributes to the corporate tax base and
the capital intensity of production. Depending on the sign of the quality effects, the
detrimental welfare effects of corporate taxation are either mitigated or aggravated.
We derive a number of hypotheses how corporate tax changes may affect the quality
of investment. Our hypotheses are then tested using data from a large sample of
European multinationals. With regard to corporate tax effects on the corporate tax
base, we find that quality effects account for up to fourty per cent of the total effect.
With regard to corporate tax effects on labour income, our results suggest that quality
effects mitigate the negative quantity effect by nearly sixty percent (as corporate taxes
strongly increase the labor intensity of production). An important implication is that
governments should not exclusively care about the size of inbound FDI flows but also
about their specific characteristics, i.e. their quality.
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1 Introduction
The last decades experienced an unprecedented boom in foreign direct investment
(FDI). In 2008, the worldwide stock of inward FDI was USD 14, 909 billion, only
slightly less than its alltime high in 2007, compared to only USD 1, 457 billion in
1988 (source: UNCTAD).1 While multinational firms are seen to be the main driving
force behind FDI growth (see, e.g., Bernard & Jensen, 2007, Bernard et al., 2007),
governments throughout the world have supported this trend by improving the policy
environment for border crossing investment. From a policy perspective, attracting FDI
is widely considered to be beneficial for the host country because this investment is
thought to provide new growth opportunities, higher wages, larger tax revenues - in
short: a higher welfare level.
Among the policy instruments which can be used to attract investment, taxes play
a key role. In the last decades, many countries have reduced their corporate tax
rates in order to attract FDI (see, e.g., Devereux, Griffith & Klemm, 2002, Loretz
2008).2 Empirical research has measured the effects of these tax reforms and finds that
there is indeed a strong and robust impact of corporate tax cuts on the quantity of
inbound FDI.3 However, as an indicator of success, the quantity of assets attracted by a
corporate tax rate cut may be misleading or at least incomplete. The reason is that the
welfare of the host country will depend on the impact of FDI on tax revenue and labour
income generated by the investment and much less on the mere investment quantity.
In this paper, we argue that taxes do not only affect the quantity of (inbound) FDI
but also its quality, i.e. the degree to which FDI creates jobs and how it contributes
to tax revenue in the host country. We will show empirically that taking into account
the quality aspect of FDI has considerable consequences for optimal tax policy.
1See the UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2009, available on www.unctad.org. For purpose of
comparison, the subgroup of developed countries had a stock of inward FDI of USD 1,000 billion in
1988 and of USD 10,212 billion in 2008. All numbers are in current prices and exchange rates.
2Effective average tax rates, which are likely to be the relevant indicator for firm location have
been reduced from 37.4 per cent in 1982 to 23.9 per cent in 2007, see Loretz (2008).
3These studies are surveyed and discussed in de Mooij and Ederveen (2003) and Devereux (2007).
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For purpose of illustration, consider the following example. A multinational firm sets
up two new affiliates, one in Ireland, the other in Spain. The two investment projects
are equal in terms of quantity, i.e. the amounts of capital invested in each country
are identical. However, due to the low Irish corporate tax rate, the highly profitable
financing department is located in Ireland while the industrial assembly lines, with
low profitability and a large payroll, which is deductible from the corporate tax base,
are located in Spain. How are these investments to be evaluated in welfare terms?
According to the conventional quantity-based success indicator, both countries were
equally successful in attracting FDI. However, the investment in Ireland boosts the
Irish corporate tax base while the investment located in Spain only marginally adds to
the Spanish corporate tax base. It increases labour income in Spain, though, and boosts
Spanish payroll tax revenue. Thus, the Spanish and the Irish investment are equal in
quantity but very different in quality. Both investment characteristics, quantity and
quality, are potentially affected by the level of corporate tax rates (Ireland attracts the
profitable investment, Spain the labour-intensive one). Measuring the quantity and
quality effects of corporate taxes on FDI is in the focus of this paper.
In the first part of the paper, we propose a simple model in order to explain and
define precisely our notion of quantity versus quality. We consider a model of a small
open economy where a benevolent government sets the corporate tax rate so as to max-
imize national welfare. Corporate tax policy faces a trade-off between the objectives
of raising more revenue from a given tax base and attracting additional investment.
We show that the optimal tax rate is a function of the quantitative and qualitative
tax rate elasticities of investment. In order to operationalize the model for empirical
analysis, we derive three hypotheses concerning the effects of corporate tax rate in-
creases on the quality and quantity of FDI. Hypothesis 1 states, not surprisingly, that
a higher corporate tax rate decreases the quantity of investment. Hypothesis 2 says
that a higher corporate tax rate reduces the contribution of each unit of capital to the
corporate tax base. Hypothesis 3 claims that a higher corporate tax rate increases the
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labour income generated per unit of investment. While the first hypothesis is theoreti-
cally straightforward and empirically well established, the second and third hypotheses
require some further discussion.
To begin with hypothesis 2, the reason for a negative quality effect may be transfer
pricing or thin capitalization, as has been extensively shown by the literature.4 These
studies interpret profitability differences between high- and low-tax economies as evi-
dence for paper shifting behaviour and usually find that tax differences across locations
of a multinational group are a strong predictor for the location of accounting profits. It
may also be that this pattern is caused by the mobility of firms with different levels of
profitability (Haufler & Stahler, 2009) or project selection within multinational firms
(Becker & Fuest, 2009). Note, though, that taxation may theoretically also increase the
average profitability of investment. This is the case if taxes mainly drive out the least
profitable investment projects, so that the average profitability of investment projects
remaining in the country increases.
Consider finally hypothesis 3, which states that a higher corporate tax rate increases
the amount of labour income generated per unit of investment. A reason for this could
be that the production technology allows for the substitution of capital by labour.
Alternatively, capital intensive tasks may be relocated to a foreign location within
the multinational group.5 This effect is economically important because an important
benefit that governments associate with inbound FDI is increased wages and/or reduced
unemployment. If the third hypothesis is supported by the data, the negative welfare
effect of a tax-induced reduction of investment is partly mitigated by the higher labour
intensity of production. However, it cannot be excluded that the decrease in the capital
intensity of production reduces wages. In this case, the efficiency cost of corporate
taxation may even be aggravated by the quality effect.
Taken together, a change in the host country’s corporate tax rate may affect the
quantity of inbound investment as well as the quality of each incoming unit of invest-
4See e.g. Grubert & Mutti (1991), Hines & Rice (1994), Huizinga & Laeven (2008), Dischinger
(2008), Dischinger & Riedel (2008) and Weichenrieder (forthcoming).
5See Becker & Fuest (2007) and, in a tax-unrelated context, Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg (2008).
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ment. The size and the sign of these effects on quantity and quality will determine the
optimal tax rate. We argue that, depending on the sign and the size of the quality
effects of corporate taxation, neglecting these quality effects implies that the efficiency
cost of taxation is either underestimated or overestimated.
In the second part of the paper, we test these hypotheses using micro-level firm
data from a large panel of European corporations. We find evidence for the quantity
effect and both quality effects. Firstly, increases in the corporate tax rate decrease
the quantity of foreign capital invested. Secondly, corporate taxes tend to reduce the
contribution to the corporate tax base per capital unit. With respect to the corporate
tax base, our results suggest that the quality effect reinforces the quantity effect and
accounts for around 40 per cent of the overall effect. Thirdly, increasing corporate
tax rates ceteris paribus increases the labour income generated per unit of corporate
investment. This compensates the negative quantity impact of corporate taxes on
payroll by around 60 per cent.
So far, the literature has mainly treated quantity and quality effects of taxation
separately (see the literature cited above). Recently, however, there is increased atten-
tion to welfare implications of corporate taxes. Gruber & Rauh (2007) and Dwenger
& Steiner (2008) measure the tax base elasticity with regard to corporate tax rate
changes. This elasticity can be interpreted as a summary measure of corporate tax
effects. Due to data limitations, though, quantity effects cannot be differentiated from
quality effects. Arulampalam et al. (2007) deal with the incidence of corporate taxes
on wages. They find that an increase in corporate taxes is associated with a significant
wage decrease. Here, quantity effects of taxes are only accounted for as far as they
affect the wage rate. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to explictly
analyze quantity and quality effects of corporate taxation from a welfare perspective.
From a policy perspective, the distinction between quality and quantity effects of
corporate tax rate changes is of key importance. For example, it may well be that coun-
tries with high taxes attract primarily low profitability investment or even investment
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which generates tax losses. The quantity of investment may not differ much from that
of other countries, but the welfare effects of this investment would be different because
the investment diminishes the tax base. Thus, the welfare cost of tax distortions may
be higher than suggested by studies focusing on the quantity aspect alone. In contrast,
if FDI is mainly supposed to increase employment and/or wages, our findings suggest
that a tax-induced reduction in FDI is mitigated by a simultaneous increase in labour
intensity. In general, policies which aim at attracting foreign direct investment may
have to pay more attention to the qualitative dimension of this investment.
The rest of the paper is set up as follows. In section 2, we derive the hypotheses
which are used in the empirical section 3. Section 4 concludes.
2 A simple model of optimal corporate tax policy
with quality and quantity effects
In the following, we develop a highly stylised model of corporate taxation in an open
economy in order to explain the difference between tax effects on the quality and
quantity of investment.
Consider an open economy with many identical households and two production
sectors. Domestic welfare is given by W = Y + ηG , where Y is disposable income
of domestic residents, η is the marginal utility of public expenditure (or the marginal
cost of public funds) and G is aggregate public expenditure.
There are two production sectors. The first sector is an international industrial
sector employing internationally mobile capital and internationally immobile labour.
The second one is a domestic service sector where labour is the only input. To make
things very simple, we assume that overall payroll is given by P + s(N −P ) , where P
is payroll in the industrial sector and s(N−P ) is payroll in the domestic service sector.
This stylized formulation implies that a decline in payroll generated in the industrial
sector by one unit will be replaced by s units of payroll in the domestic service sector.
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For instance, assume that the technology in the service sector is linear, so that the
wage rate is pinned down in this sector. If there is perfect wage flexibility in the
international sector and labour is perfectly mobile across sectors, wages in both sectors
would be equated and we would have s = 1. In this case, the fact that investment
in the industrial sector creates more jobs in this sector would have no impact on
domestic welfare because labour would only be reallocated from the service sector and
neither disposable labour income nor (labour) tax revenue would change. But if s < 1,
more employment in the international sector would also increase labour income in the
economy as a whole.6
Disposable income of domestic residents, Y , consists of after-tax labour income and
a share φ ∈ [0, 1] of after-tax corporate profits generated in the industrial sector. Profits
in the service sector are equal to zero. The parameter φ is the domestic ownership share
in industrial sector firms. Domestic ownership of firms located abroad is ruled out for
simplicity. Thus, disposable income is given by Y = (P+s(N−P ))(1−tP )+φB(1−tB),
where P is payroll in the industrial sector, B stands for corporate profits generated
in the domestic economy, tP and tB are proportional taxes on labour income and
corporate profits, respectively. Accordingly, government expenditure is given by G =
tP (P + s(N −P )) + tBB. FDI affects domestic welfare by changing payroll, profits and
tax revenue.
For later use, denote the quantity of FDI in the country by k and define payroll
per unit of capital, p ≡ P/k, and corporate profits per unit of capital, b ≡ B/k. The
country’s welfare function can now be expressed as
W = αsN + (α (1− s) p+ βb)k (1)
where α ≡ 1 + (η − 1)tP and β ≡ φ + (η − φ)tc are the social marginal utility of
labour income and profits, respectively. In this welfare function, the variables p and b
6It would be straightforward to write down an explicit model with a dual labour market with these
properties. However, this would divert attention from the focus of this paper without adding many
new insights.
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reflect the qualitative dimension of domestic investment; p is the average labour income
“generated” per unit of FDI and b is the value of the corporate tax base per unit of
investment. The quantitative dimension is captured by the investment level k. The
impact of a change in the corporate tax on welfare can now be expressed as
∂W
∂tc
= (η − φ)bk + (α (1− s) p+ βb) ∂k
∂tc
+ α (1− s) k ∂p
∂tc
+ βk
∂b
∂tc
(2)
The effect of the tax change on the quantity of investment is captured by the second
term on the right hand side of (2) while the effects on the quality of investment is given
by the third and the fourth term. By setting the right hand side of (2) equal to zero
we can derive a formula for the optimal corporate tax rate:
tc∗ = − 1
εk + εb
− α (1− s)
(η − φ)
p
b
(εk + εp)
(εk + εb)
− φ
(η − φ) (3)
where εk ≡ ∂k∂tc 1k , εp = ∂p∂tc 1p and εb = ∂b∂tc 1b are semi-elasticities representing the
quantity and quality effects of corporate taxation. We will return to this formula
further below. What should we expect regarding the sign of the quantity and quality
effects? It would be straightforward to write down a model of a firm employing labour
and capital to derive the effects. Since this is very standard in the literature, we restrict
ourselves to a discussion of what such a standard model would generate. The sign of
the quantity effect will usually be negative, i.e. εk < 0.
7 For the quality effects εb and
εp, predictions are less clear.
Consider first the impact of tax changes on the amount of payroll per unit of in-
vestment. For a given non-tax cost of capital, an increase in the corporate income tax
increases the cost of capital relative to the cost of labour. If the firm is able to substi-
tute capital with labour input, this increases the payroll (due to higher labour input or
higher wages) for a given level of investment. However, if capital and labour are tech-
nological complements, a decrease in the stock of capital reduces labour productivity
7Theoretically, a higher tax rate could also reduce the cost of capital, in particular in the presence
of accelerated depreciation.
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which, for a given level of investment, reduces payroll (due to lower wages). It is a
priori unclear which of the two effects prevails, i.e. whether the quality of investment
in terms of generating labour income increases or decreases in response to a change in
the corporate tax rate.
Now, consider the effect of a corporate tax rate change on the the corporate tax
base per unit of investment. Higher corporate tax rates are likely to increase both the
marginal and the average tax burden. If only the marginal and, thus, least profitable
projects are driven out of the market, the corporate tax base per capital unit may
actually increase. If, however, economic rents are not bound to the country under
consideration, firms might move profitable operations to other countries. The incentives
to move real economic activity to other countries created by the higher tax are the
stronger, the higher the profitability of the activity. This suggests that firms will move
the most profitable functions first, so that the corporate tax base per capital unit may
actually decrease. Moreover, firms are likely to react to the higher corporate tax by
shifting book profits abroad through transfer pricing, debt financing and so on. Again,
it is unclear which of the two effects is stronger, i.e. whether the quality of investment
in terms of generating corporate tax revenue increases or declines.
These considerations can be summarized as
Hypothesis 1 (Quantity) An increase in tc decreases the capital stock k: εk < 0.
Hypothesis 2 (Quality - Tax Base Contribution) An increase in tc decreases the
contribution to the corporate tax base per unit of investment b: εb < 0.
Hypothesis 3 (Quality-Labour Income Contribution) An increase in tc increases
the payroll-capital ratio εp > 0.
Note that, from a theoretical perspective, hypotheses 2 and 3 may be stated with
opposite signs. As explained above, the signs and the magnitudes of the quality and
quantity effects are important for corporate tax policy. In the next section, we use firm
data to directly estimate the quantity and quality effects εk, εb and εp.
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3 Data
We use the commercial database AMADEUS compiled by Bureau van Dijk. The ver-
sion of the database available to us contains detailed information on firm structure
and accounting of national and multinational corporations in European countries. Our
sample contains information on multinational affiliates in 22 countries (Austria, Bel-
gium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece,
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal,
Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland) for the time period 2000 to 2006.8 Precisely,
firms are included into the analysis if either their parent company or one of their
wholly owned subsidiaries is located in a foreign economy. A country distribution of
our sample affiliates is presented in Table 1.9
The observational unit in our analysis is the multinational affiliate per year. In
total, our sample comprises 101, 059 observations from 26, 473 affiliates for the years
2000 to 2006. Hence, we observe each affiliate for 3.8 years on average. Besides the
rich set of accounting information available in AMADEUS, we enlarge our data set by
merging information on the country’s tax system, i.e. statutory corporate tax rates,
effective marginal tax rates and the present values of capital allowances, obtained
from European Commission (2006), KPMG (2006) and Loretz (2008). Moreover, we
add information on GDP as a proxy for market size, GDP per capita as a proxy for a
country’s income and development level, the unemployment rate as a proxy for the state
of a country’s economy and the corruption index as a proxy for the state of governance
institutions. The corruption index is obtained from Transparency International while
the other country data is retrieved from the World Development Indicator Database.
Last, we add information on the labour tax wedge obtained from OECD’s tax data
8The AMADEUS data is in principle available since 1999. However, as we observe some of our tax
information for 2000 onwards only, we restrict the sample to the years 2000 to 2006.
9Note that the country statistic broadly corresponds to the distribution of economic activity in
Europe. Nevertheless, in line with previous work, we also find that some countries are underrepresented
in the AMADEUS data, for example Germany and Switzerland, which suggests that some caution is
warranted when drawing conclusions from our results for the population of firms in these countries.
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base which is measured as the marginal tax burden of a worker who earns the country’s
median income (whereas the results are however robust against evaluating the labour
tax wedge at other points of the income distribution).
– Table 1 here –
Note that not only the host country’s corporate tax rate but also the tax rate
differential to other firms within the same multinational group may have an impact on
affiliate behavior. For instance, profit shifting or the choice of locations for projects
may depend on these tax rate differentials, rather than tax rates of individual countries.
We use our data set to construct a tax measure which captures these effects. As the
AMADEUS data contains information on the ownership structure of multinational
groups on a worldwide basis (while the accounting information is restricted to firms
located in Europe), we observe all group affiliates worldwide and their host countries.
To construct the tax difference measure, we identify a firm’s global ultimate owner and
consider all its majority owned subsidiaries to be affiliates within the multinational
group. Then, we calculate an unweighted average tax rate differential between the
considered affiliates and all other majority owned firms in the multinational group
(including the parent if the considered firm is not an independent company itself).10
Table 2 displays basic sample statistics. The affiliates in our sample observe an
average fixed asset investment of USD 166.0 million, employ 543.7 employees and have
average yearly costs per worker of USD 62.5 thousand. Labour intensity, defined as
labour-to-fixed asset-ratio and payroll-to-fixed asset-ratio, is determined with 0.14 and
8.14 respectively. Corporate pre-tax profitability (measured as pre-tax profits over total
assets) is 12.64 per cent. Pre-tax profitability is used to proxy the firm’s corporate tax
base. Although accounting profits may diverge from the the firm’s tax book profit
10An alternative procedure would be to calculate a size weighted average tax differential. However,
as the size information is unavailable for a large number of group affiliates in our data (especially those
located outside Europe), this would imply that we lose a considerable number of observations in the
calculation of the tax rate difference variable. Thus, we decided to employ the unweighted measure in
our baseline estimations. In robustness checks, we however reestimated the regression models using
size weighted averages and did not find our qualitative results to change.
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(e.g. Hanlon and Maydew, 2009), they are nevertheless widely considered to be a good
proxy for the the corporate tax base, especially for European countries in which the
divergence between accounting and tax books is less pronounced than for example in
the US (see e.g. Huizinga and Laeven, 2008).
Moreover, the firms in our data base on average face a corporate tax rate of 32.5 per
cent which varies strongly between 10 and 51.6 per cent. The unweighted average tax
rate differential between the affiliate and other firms within the multinational group is
determined with 0.6 per cent but equally exhibits a strong spread between −31.1 and
+35.6 per cent. The effective marginal tax rate is calculated with 11.31 per cent varying
between 0.1 and 17.27 per cent while the average present value of capital allowances is
66.0 per cent ranging from 53.4 to 74.6 per cent. Last, the marginal labour tax wedge
for employees with the mean country income is 52.1 per cent, varying between 33 per
cent and 77 per cent.
Additionally, our sample firms’ host countries exhibit an average GDP of USD 990.3
billion, an average GDP per capita rate of USD 30, 250.8, an average unemployment
rate of 7.5 per cent and an average corruption index of 7.5 (on a scale from 0 (poor)
to 10 (excellent) indicating the quality of governance institutions).
– Table 2 here –
4 Estimation Approach
In order to disentangle quality and quantity effects of corporate taxation, we determine
the impact of corporate tax rate changes on the size of a firm’s capital stock (quantity
effect) and on the profitability and payroll intensity of investment (quality effects). Let
k, b and p denote the investment quantity, profitability and payroll intensity. Quality
and quantity effects are estimated in a static and dynamic investment framework where
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the static model reads
log xi,t = β
x
0 + β
x
1 τ
x
i,t + β
x
2Z
x
i,t + ρ
x
t + φ
x
i + 
x
i,t with x ∈ {k, b, p} (4)
with xi,t representing the fixed asset stock, profitability or payroll intensity of affiliate
i at time t. As the distributions of all three variables are strongly skewed, we use
logarithmic transformations as regressands.11 τxi,t depicts a measure for the corporate
tax burden of affiliate i at time t. The superscipt x ∈ {k, b, p} indicates the variable
definition in the regressions using fixed assets, profitability and the payroll intensity as
the dependent variable. In the baseline specifications, the variable takes the form of
the statutory tax rate ti,t. The profitability and payroll intensity regressions moreover
account for a second tax measure which is the unweighted tax rate differential between
the affiliate and other firms in the multinational group as defined in the previous
section. Including the tax rate differential takes into accout that, conditional on the
affiliate location, the multinational’s decision where to locate its profitable and/or labor
intensive investment projects may depend on the tax structure of the overall group.
Zxi,t comprises time varying firm-specific and country-specific control characteristics.
Country-specific control variables are used to absorb variations in market size (proxied
by GDP), income level (proxied by GDP per capita), state of the economy (proxied
by the unemployment rate) and quality of governance institutions (proxied by the
corruption index). Firm-specific control variables are used depending on the regressand
x. In the regressions which employ the affiliates’ profitability and payroll intensity as
the dependent variable, we include a control variable for affiliate size as measured by
sales (the results being robust against using other size controls like the number of
employees or total assets). The profitability regressions moreover include a control
variable for the affiliate’s labour intensity. ρxt depicts year dummies to capture shocks
over time which are common to all affiliates, in some specifications we additionally
11As this is also true for the distribution of profitability (see, e.g., Huizinga and Laeven, 2008), the
sample is restricted to affiliates with positive pre-tax profits which we consider to be sensible in our
context as tax considerations plausibly only play a role for firms with a positive tax base.
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include a full set of industry-year dummies (at the two-digit level) to account for
industry-specific shocks over time. xi,t describes the error term. Moreover, we add
fixed effects for multinational affiliates to control for non-observable time-constant firm
specific characteristics φxi .
A shortcoming of the static estimation approach described in equation (4) is that
it does not take into account the costs associated with adjusting capital or labour
demand at the firm level and consequently neglects that the subsidiary’s capital and
labour stock is dependent on the stocks of previous periods. Therefore, we additionally
estimate a dynamic model. Since including the first lag of the dependent variable into
the set of regressors in a fixed effects framework leads to biased coefficient estimates, we
follow Arellano and Bond (1991) in estimating a first difference generalized method of
moments (GMM) model which instruments for the first difference in the lagged depen-
dent variable by deeper lags of the level of the dependent variable.12 The estimation
equation then takes on the following form
∆ log(xi,t) = γ
x
1 ∆ log(xi,t−1) + γ
x
2 ∆τ
x
i,t + γ
x
3 ∆Z
x
i,t + ∆ρ
x
t + ∆
x
i,t with x ∈ {k, b, p} (5)
where ∆ depicts the difference operator and the variable definitions correspond to the
ones in equation (4).13 Because the model is estimated in first differences, the equation
will be characterized by the presence of first order serial correlation. However, the
validity of the GMM estimator relies on the absence of second order serial correlation.
The Arellano and Bond (1991) test statistic for second order serial correlation will
be reported at the bottom of the result tables. We check for the exogeneity of the
12Note that the difference in the lagged dependent variable correlates with the differenced error
term. However, deeper lags (starting from the second lag) of the dependent variable (in levels) are
available as valid instruments as they are orthogonal to the error term.
13With panel data on more than two time periods, it is not equivalent to apply a fixed effect and first
differencing approach respectively. Both models give unbiased and consistent estimates although the
relative efficiency of the estimators may differ, depending on the model structure. Precisely, the fixed
effect estimator is less sensitive against the violation of strict exogeneity of the regressors while the
first differencing estimator is less sensitive against the violation of serially uncorrelated error terms.
Our results, however, turn out to be largely robust against using fixed effects and first differencing
estimators.
13
instrument set by employing a Sargan/Hansen overidentification test.14
In the profitability regressions, we find - in line with previous studies - only a shallow
serial correlation in the pre-tax profit variable and thus refrain from presenting dynamic
specifications in the paper (γb1 = 0). However, the profitability estimations may be
especially prone to reverse causality problems. It may well be the case, that it is
not only size and labour intensity which affect the reported pre-tax profit per capital
unit but that in reverse corporate profitability also drives the firm’s investment and
employment decision. Therefore, we employ the levels estimator proposed by Anderson
and Hsiao (1982) which suggests to control for time constant affiliate effects by taking
the first differences of the estimation equation and to instrument for the difference in
the endogenous variable by employing lagged levels of this variable. Our result tables
will report the Kleibergen/Paap test statistic for the relevance of the instruments at
the first stage and the Sargan/Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions to assess the
validity of the instruments employed.15
5 Results
The regression results are depicted in Tables 3 to 7. All specifications include a full
set of year fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors which account for
clustering at the firm level are calculated and presented in brackets below the coefficient
estimates.
In Table 3, we identify the quantity effect of corporate taxation and thus measure
the impact of corporate rate changes on the firm’s capital stock. Specifications (1) to
(4) present the results for the static fixed-effects model which is described by equa-
tion (4) in the previous section. In column (1), a baseline estimation is presented
without any additional control variables. Columns (2) and (3) show the results of
14We will present results for the standard dynamic specification including only the first lag of the
dependent variable. However, in robustness checks we accounted for deeper lags of the dependent
variable and did not find our results to be affected.
15In robustness checks, we also reran the specification using the GMM estimator proposed by
Arellano and Bond (1991) described above and found comparable results.
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regressions including a set of time-varying country-specific control variables (precisely
the host country’s GDP, GDP per capita, the corruption index, unemployment rate,
the present value of capital allowances) and a full set of industry-year fixed effects. In
all three specifications, the estimations show a strongly and significantly negative semi-
elasticity of investment with respect to changes in the corporate tax rate. According
to specification (3), a one percentage point increase in the corporate tax rate decreases
the capital stock by 1.4 per cent. Specification (4) reestimates the regression in col-
umn (3) merging the information on the statutory corporate tax rate and depreciation
allowances into one measure, the effective marginal tax rate on an investment project.
This regression confirms the significantly negative impact of the effective marginal tax
rate on capital investment.
In specifications (5) to (8) we reestimate the causal effect of corporate taxation on a
firm’s capital investment in a dynamic framework as specified in equation (5). All four
specifications indicate that capital investment is sticky as the coefficient estimate for
the lagged dependent variable is positive and quantitatively large. Most importantly,
the estimations confirm the negative effect of corporate taxes on subsidiary investment
whereas the coefficient estimate for the corporate tax effect remains sizable. Column
(7) suggests that a one percentage point increase in the corporate tax rate at the
subsidiary’s host location reduces capital investment by 1.1 per cent in the short run.
The long run effect is larger and estimated with 1.8 per cent (and is thus quantitatively
in line with previous results in the literature, see e.g. de Mooij and Ederveen, 2005).16
– Table 3 here –
The validity of the Arellano and Bond (1991) approach relies on two assumptions:
the exogeneity of the instrument set with respect to the error term and the absence
16 The long-run effect is estimated by multiplying the coefficient estimate for the corporate tax rate
with 1/(1-γ1) with γ1 being the coefficient estimate for the lagged dependent variable in the dynamic
panel model. Note that the sample size for the dynamic estimations is smaller than for the fixed
effects specifications since for firms to be included in the dynamic estimation framework, we have to
observe the fixed asset variable for at least three successive periods (to construct the first difference
of the dependent variable and the first difference of the lagged dependent variable). This implies that
firms with less successive observations are dropped from the estimation.
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of second order autocorrelation. As indicated in the previous chapter, we apply a
Sargan/Hansen overidentification test to check the former assumption and the Arellano
and Bond (1991) test for second order autocorrelation to check the latter one. The
test statistics are reported at the bottom of Table 3 and indicate that the estimation
strategy is valid.
In Tables 4a and 4b, we present the first part of our quality estimations with regard
to the pre-tax profitability of corporate investment. Specifications (1) to (4) of Table
4a follow a standard fixed effects approach. While column (1) contains the baseline
estimation, columns (2) and (3) add time-varying control variables and a full set of
industry-year dummies. Column (4) additionally controls for the affiliate’s labour
intensity and affiliate sales as a proxy for firm size. The corporate tax rate is found
to exert a strong and significantly negative impact on corporate profitability in all
specifications. Quantitatively, column (4) suggests that an increase in the corporate
tax rate by one percentage point reduces the pre-tax profit per asset unit by 1.3 per
cent.
In column (5) we reestimate specification (4) but additionally account for potential
reverse causality with respect to labour intensity and firm size applying the instrumen-
tal variables approach proposed by Anderson and Hsiao (1982). For the specifications
to be valid, the chosen instrument set of lagged levels of the input factors has to be
a relevant predictor of the first-differenced inputs and it has to be uncorrelated with
the error term. Both assumptions are confirmed by the test statistics for the Sar-
gan/Hansen test and the Kleibergen-Paap test presented in the table. Interestingly,
accounting for reverse causality confirms the positive impact of the labour intensity
on the firm’s pre-tax profitability reported in the OLS fixed effects specifications while
the size effect on pre-tax profitability turns negative, indicating that the corporate
pre-tax profitability tends to fall with firm size. Moreover, the estimated corporate
tax effect on affiliate profitability is quantitatively unchanged. This result is robust
against normalising pre-tax profits on other input factors like sales or the number of
16
employees. Specifications (6) and (7) reestimate the regressions in columns (4) and
(5) but employ pre-tax profits over fixed assets as the dependent variable which yields
comparable results.17
So far, our estimations have only determined the effect of corporate tax rate changes
on affiliate investment. However, the corporate tax difference between the affiliate and
other firms within the same multinational group may also be an important predictor of
firm profitability. Accordingly, we reestimate the specifications presented in Table 4a
employing the corporate tax rate difference between the affiliate and other group mem-
bers as a tax determinant. The results are presented in Table 4b and indicate that the
profitability per capital unit is significantly larger the smaller the affiliate’s corporate
tax rate relative to other group members’ tax rates. Specification (5) suggests that an
increase in the tax rate differential by one percentage point reduces the subsidiary’s
asset profitability by 1.1 per cent.
– Tables 4a and 4b here –
The second part of our quality estimations focuses on labour intensity and is pre-
sented in Tables 5a to 6b. Tables 5a and 5b depict the results for regressions employing
the labour-to-fixed asset-ratio as dependent variable. Column (1) presents the baseline
specifications including the corporate tax rate and a full set of affiliate and year fixed
effects which is augmented by the time-varying country controls GDP, GDP per capita,
the corruption index and the unemployment rate in Column (2) and by industry-year
fixed effects in Column (3). In columns (4) and (5), we additionally account for the
impact of the labour tax wedge, capital allowances, affiliate size (as measured by sales),
the average worker’s wage rate and firm profitability (as measured by pre-tax profits
over fixed assets). The corporate tax rate exerts a statistically significant and positive
effect on the labour-to-fixed asset-ratio in all specifications. Quantitatively, column
17 Note that the sample size drops in the instrumental variable estimations compared to the fixed
effects specifications as for firms to be included in the instrumental variables regressions two successive
observations for the regressand (and the regressors) have to be available in the data plus informations
on the lags of the instrumented variables.
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(5) suggests that a one percentage point increase in the corporate tax rate enlarges
the labour-to-capital-ratio by 1.6 per cent. Moreover, in specifications (6) and (7), we
additionally account for dynamic patterns in the adjustments of the labour-to-capital-
ratio and reestimate the regressions (4) and (5) in an Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM
framework including a lagged dependent variable which leaves the coefficient estimate
for the corporate tax rate variable largely unaltered.18 Quantitatively, specification
(7) suggests that a one percentage point increase in the corporate tax rate raises the
labour to capital ratio by 1.5 per cent in the short run and by 2.3 per cent in the long
run.
Again, we reestimate the specifications presented in Table 5a employing the tax
rate differential to other group affiliates as a tax measure. The results are presented
in Table 5b and yield that the labour intensity of production rises in the corporate tax
rate differential to other group affiliates. The results are hence in line with the notion
that multinational groups tend to locate their labor intensive investment projects in
high-tax affiliates within the group and vice versa. Specification (7) suggests that an
increase in the corporate tax rate by one percentage point raises the labour-to-fixed
asset-ratio by 0.4 per cent in the short run and 0.57 in the long run.
– Tables 5a and 5b here –
In Tables 6a and 6b, we reassess the effect of corporate taxes on the labour intensity
by using the payroll-to-capital-ratio as the dependent variable. The results reported
in Table 6a suggest that the corporate tax rate exerts a significantly positive effect on
the payroll-to-capital-ratio which is robust against controlling for time-varying country
controls, industry-year fixed effects, affiliate size and affiliate profitability. Moreover,
the effect equally appears if we estimate a dynamic GMM model as indicated by speci-
fications (6) and (7). Compared to the regressions which use the labour-to-fixed asset-
ratio as the dependent variable, the coefficient estimates for the corporate tax rate
variable are quantitatively smaller. Specification (7) suggests that a one percentage
18 Using the GMM approach again implies that the sample size drops, see footnote 16.
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point increase in the corporate tax rate raises the payroll-to-capital-ratio by 0.7 per
cent in the short run and by 1.1 per cent in the long run. Somewhat weaker results are
found if we regress the payroll-to-capital-ratio on the tax rate differential between the
affiliates and other firms in the multinational group as presented in Table 6b. The co-
efficient estimate for the tax difference variable does not gain statistical significance in
the static regressions unless we include firm profitability as a control variable in Speci-
fication (5). Reestimating specification (5) in a dynamic model dampens the coefficient
estimate for the tax differential which now just fails to be statistically significant at the
10 per cent level. Nevertheless, dropping small firms with less than 50 employees from
the regression (which are expected to react the least sensitively to tax rate changes)
quantitatively increases the coefficient estimate and renders it statistically significant
at the 5 per cent level as reported in specification (7).
The fact that the corporate tax effects on payroll-intensity fall short from the labour-
intensity estimates suggests that taxes exert a negative impact on the average wage
rate earned by the affiliate’s workers which is in line with previous findings in the
literature (see Arulampalam et al., 2007). This result is confirmed in Table 7 where
we regress the logarithm of the average worker’s wage level on the corporate tax rate
and find a significant and negative effect which suggests that part of the additional
tax burden on multinational firms is in fact borne by the multinationals’ employees.
Note in this context that the corporate tax effect on the labour-to-capital-ratio is not
driven by this wage adjustment as we control for workers’ wages in the specifications
presented in Tables 5a and 5b.
– Tables 6a and 6b here –
6 Discussion of the results
Our estimations indicate that corporate taxation does not only exert a negative effect
on the quantity of capital investment but also affect the quality of corporate investment
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projects located in a country. We find that corporate taxation reduces profitability and
increases ’payroll intensity’ of investment. Plugging in our coefficient estimates from
column (7) in Table 3, column (7) in Table 4a and Column (7) in Table 6a yields the
following semielasticities: An increase in the corporate tax rate by one percentage point
reduces the quantity of investment by 1.82 per cent (εk =
γk2
1−γk1
= −1.82). The profit
per unit of investment declines by 1.27 per cent (εb = γ
b
2 = −1.27) and the labour
income generated per unit of investment increases by 1.06 per cent (εp =
γp2
1−γp1 = 1.06).
What does this imply for the overall effects of corporate tax changes on the profit
tax base and on payroll? Note that, with B = bk, the semi-elasticity of the corporate
tax base with respect to the corporate tax rate can be written as
∂B
∂t
1
B
=
∂k
∂t
· b
B
+
∂b
∂t
· k
B
= εk + εb = −1.82− 1.27 = −3.09 (6)
An increase in the corporate tax rate by one percentage point is predicted to lower
the corporate tax base by 3.1 per cent. Quantity and quality effect are found to
significantly contribute to this result, with the quality effect accounting for 42 per cent
of the overall effect.
Similarly, using P = pk, we can calculate the effect on payroll as
∂P
∂t
1
P
=
∂k
∂t
· p
P
+
∂p
∂t
· k
P
= εk + εp = −1.82 + 1.06 = −0.76 (7)
Thus, while corporate tax increases drive investment out of the country and conse-
quently diminish payroll, this negative quantity effect is mitigated, albeit not reversed,
by a positive quality effect which suggests that labour partly substitutes for capital in-
vestment. The estimations suggest that the quality effect compensates around 58 per
cent (1.06/ (−1.82) = −0.58) of the negative quantity impact on payroll. The overall
semi-elasticity is calculated with −0.76, i.e. increasing the corporate tax rate by one
percentage point reduces the labour tax base by 0.76 per cent on average.19
19Note that the sample size differs across the specifications used to evaluate quantity and quality
effects of corporate taxation against each other which is driven by the differing regression requirements
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For illustrative purposes, it is interesting to use these results in the formula for the
optimal tax rate in (3). Consider firstly the case where the government ignores the
quality effects of corporate taxation. Equation (3) then reads
tc∗0 = 0.55−
α (1− s)
(η − φ)
p
b
− φ
(η − φ) (8)
Under the extreme assumptions that all firms are foreign owned (φ = 0) and that
a job loss in the international sector in our model will immediately be compensated
by the creation of a job in the rest of the economy (s = 1), the optimal corporate
income tax rate is equal to 55 per cent. If these assumptions are relaxed, a lower rate
is optimal. Assume instead that s = 0.8, i.e. a loss of labour income of 1 Euro in the
industrial sector can only be replaced by an increase in income in the service sector of
80 Cents. Assume further that the share of domestic households in firm ownership (φ)
is still zero, the payroll tax (tp) is 50 per cent, the marginal cost of public funds (η) is
1.25, and the payroll-profit ratio in the industrial sector (p/b) is 2/1. In this case, the
optimal tax rate is equal to 19 per cent.
Now, assume that the government takes account of quality effects. The optimal tax
rate reads
tc∗1 = 0.32−
α (1− s)
(η − φ)
p
b
0.25− φ
(η − φ) (9)
With φ = 0 and s = 1, the optimal tax rate is equal to 32 per cent, compared
to 55 per cent in the case where the government ignores quality effects of corporate
taxation. Thus, taking into account the impact of corporate taxation on the quality
of investment leads to lower optimal corporate tax rates. Interestingly, the picture
changes, if we consider the second scenario with s = 0.8. Then, the optimal tax rate
with quality and quantity effects equals 23 per cent, compared to 19 per cent if quality
effects are ignored.
concerning the availability of lagged variables in the specifications (see also footnotes 16, 17 and 18).
In a robustness check, we constructed a subsample of observations which are included in all three
specifications and find comparable results.
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Thus, in the first scenario with s = 1, neglecting quality effects increases the optimal
tax rate, while in the second scenario with s = 0, 8, neglecting quality effects reduces
the optimal corporate tax rate. The reason is that, in the first scenario, the payroll
effects do not play a role because each loss in labour income in the industrial sector is
offset by a corresponding gain in the service sector. Only the tax effects on profitability
have to be taken into account. In the second scenario, losses in labour income due to
lower investment quantity or quality cannot be fully compensated. Then, the quality
effect in terms of labour income generated per unit of investment acts as a break on
tax cuts. Note that, although the example assumes that 80 per cent of the labour
income lost in the international sector is replaced by employment in the service sector,
the quality effect on employment is strong enough to overcompensate the quality effect
in terms of contributing to the corporate income tax base. This suggests that much
greater emphasis should be placed on investigating whether foreign direct investment
increases labour income generated in the host country.
7 Concluding remarks
Governments throughout the world have lowered corporate tax rates in order to attract
FDI. In this paper, we argue that taxes do not only affect the quantity of FDI but also
the extent to which FDI contributes to corporate tax revenue and labour income, i.e.
the quality of FDI. We use detailed data on European multinational firms to empirically
measure quantity and quality effects of corporate taxation on FDI. With regard to
quantity effects, we find a semi-elasticity of the capital stock to corporate tax rate
changes of approximately −2, which is in line with the results of previous studies. In
terms of quality effects, our results suggest that corporate taxation substantially lowers
the profitability of corporate investment projects and increases the labour intensity of
production. The importance of tax effects on investment quality can be illustrated by
considering how taxes affect the corporate tax base or labour income in general. With
regard to the corporate tax base, our findings suggests that only around 60 per cent of
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the corporate tax base reduction in the wake of tax increases is driven by a decline in
investment size while the other 40 per cent are assigned to a diminishing profitability
of the investment projects. With regard to the multinational’s payroll, the estimations
suggest that the quality effect compensates around 58 per cent of the negative quantity
impact.
These results may have important policy implications. If taxes equally distort the
quality and the quantity of FDI, measures of investment distortions based on invest-
ment quantity are likely to misrepresent the efficiency cost of taxation. Moreover, it
suggests that policy-makers should not only be concerned about the size of FDI in-
flows but equally about the profitability of the incoming projects. Thus, our results
may alter the interpretation of certain “success stories”. For example, from 1990 to
2000, Germany increased its stock of foreign held capital by about 520 per cent (source:
OECD) and performed much better in attracting foreign FDI than the UK (115 per
cent), France (205 per cent), the US (180 per cent) or Japan (410 per cent). The stan-
dard way of reading these figures is that Germany attracted FDI despite its relatively
high tax rates (before the tax reform in 2001, the corporate tax rates in Germany were
between 52 and 58 per cent and thus among the highest throughout the developed
world). In the light of our results, one would expect these large inflows of capital to
be of minor quality in the profitability dimension but of higher quality in terms of
generating labour income.
References
[1] Arulampalam W., Devereux, M.P. & Maffini, G. (2007). The Indirect Incidence of
Corporate Income Tax on Wages, CBT Working Paper 07/07.
[2] Anderson, T. W. & Hsiao, C. (1982). Formulation and Estimation of Dynamic
Models Using Panel Data, Journal of Econometrics 18(1): 47-82.
23
[3] Arellano, M. & Bond, S. R. (1991). Some Test of Specification for Panel Data:
Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations, Review of
Economic Studies 58(2): 277-297.
[4] Becker, J.& Fuest, C. (2007). Quantity versus Quality - the composition effect of
corporate taxation on foreign direct investment, CESifo Working Paper No. 2126.
[5] Bernard, A. B. & Jensen, J. B. (2007). Firm Structure, Multinationals, and Man-
ufacturing Plant Deaths, Review of Economics & Statistics 89(2): 193-204.
[6] Bernard, A. B., Jensen, J. B., Redding, S. J. & Schott, P. K. (2007). Firms in
International Trade, Journal of Economic Perspectives 21(3): 105-130.
[7] de Mooij, R. & Ederveen, S. (2003). Taxation and Foreign Direct Investment:
A Synthesis of Empirical Research, International Tax and Public Finance 10(6):
673–693.
[8] Devereux, M.P., Griffith, R. & Klemm, A. (2002). Corporate income tax reforms
and international tax competition, Economic Policy 17(35): 450-495.
[9] Devereux, M.P. and R. Griffith (2003), Evaluating Tax Policy for Location Deci-
sions, International tax and Public Finance 10, 107-126.
[10] Devereux, M. P. (2007). The Impact of Taxation on the Location of Capital, Firms
and Profit: A Survey of Empirical Evidence, Oxford University Centre for Business
Taxation Working Paper Series No. 07/2.
[11] Dischinger, M. (2008). Profit Shifting by Multinationals and the Ownership Share:
Evidence from European Micro Data, Munich Economics Discussion Papers, No.
2008-17.
[12] Dischinger, M. & Riedel, N. (2008). Corporate Taxes, Profit Shifting, and the
Location of Multinational Headquarters, Working Paper.
24
[13] Dwenger, N. & Steiner, V. (2008). Effective Profit Taxation and the Elasticity of
the Corporate Income Tax Base: Evidence from German Corporate Tax Return
Data, DIW Discussion Paper No. 829.
[14] European Commission (2006). Structures of the Taxation Systems in the European
Union, Directorate Generale Taxation and Customs Union, Brussels.
[15] Grossman, G. M. & Rossi-Hansberg, E. (2008). Trading Tasks: A Simple Theory
of Offshoring, American Economic Review 98(5): 1978-1997.
[16] Gruber, J. & Rauh, J. (2007). How Elastic Is the Corporate Income Tax Base?
in: Auerbach, A. J. et al. (eds.): Taxing Corporate Income in the 21st Century,
2007, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 140-63.
[17] Grubert, H. & Mutti, J. H. (1991). Taxes, Tariffs and Transfer Pricing in Multina-
tional Corporate Decision Making, Review of Economics and Statistics 73: 285–
293.
[18] Hanlon, M. & Maydew, E. L. (2009). Book-tax Conformity: Implications for Multi-
national Firms, National Tax Journal 72(1), pp. 127-153.
[19] Haufler, A. and F. Stahler (2009), Tax Competition in a Simple Model with Hetero-
geneous Firms, How Larger Markets reduce Profit Taxes, CESifo Working Paper
No 2687.
[20] Hines, J. R. & Rice, E. M. (1994). Fiscal Paradise: Foreign Tax Havens and
American Business, Quarterly Journal of Economics 109(1): 149–182.
[21] Huizinga, H. & Laeven, L. (2008). International Profit Shifting Within European
Multinationals, Journal of Public Economics, 92(5/6): 1164-1182.
[22] KPMG (2006). Corporate Tax Rate Survey, KPMG International, United King-
dom.
25
[23] Loretz (2008). Corporate Taxation in the OECD in a Wider Context, Oxford
Review of Economic Policy 24(4), 639-660.
[24] Weichenrieder, A. J. (forthcoming). Profit Shifting in the EU: Evidence from Ger-
many, International Tax and Public Finance.
8 Tables
Table 1: Country Statistics
Country Affiliates
Austria 282
Belgium 2,079
Czech Republic 531
Denmark 1,782
Finland 572
France 2,839
Germany 1,435
Great Britain 4,053
Greece 143
Hungary 35
Ireland 213
Island 8
Italy 2,358
Luxembourg 23
Netherlands 2,561
Norway 1,124
Poland 1,051
Portugal 277
Spain 2,669
Slovakia 84
Sweden 2,214
Switzerland 140
Sum 26,473
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max.
Affiliate Characteristics
Fixed AssetsF 101,059 165,952.5 1,610,977 1 1.05e+08
SalesF 92,571 195,835.5 1,536,974 1 1.46e+08
Number of Employees 101,059 543.700 3,568.289 1 99,837
Costs of EmployeesF 95,636 26,474.24 185,304.8 1 1.11e+07
Avg. Yearly WageF 95,636 62.488 46.732 .005 450.615
Profit before Tax F 101,059 19,175.1 191,824.7 1 1.16e+07
Profitability (Pre-Tax Profit per Total Assets) 101,059 .1264 .8140 1 219.2168
Labour-Fixed Asset Ratio 101,059 .1436 1.9360 5.49e-08 481.1111
Payroll-Fixed Assets Ratio 95,636 8.1375 100.3023 2.97e-06 19,509
Country Characteristics
Corporate Tax Rate 101,059 .3246 .0477 .1 .516
Tax Difference Group 86,623 .0061 .0651 -.3113 .356
EMTR 95,871 .1131 .0406 .0091 .1727
Marginal Labour Tax Rate† 101,059 .5210 .0842 .33 .77
PV Capital Allowances 101,059 .6604 .0540 .5344 .7458
GDPN 101,059 990.2577 782.1834 8.953 2,914.988
GDP per CapitaJ 101,059 30,250.75 11,206.31 3,768.026 74,471.23
Corruption Index 101,059 7.5199 1.6447 3.4 10
Unemployment Rate 101,059 .0752 .0329 .018 .199
Notes:
F Unconsolidated value, in thousand US dollars, current prices.
N In billion US dollars, current prices.
J In US dollars, current prices.
† Marginal tax wedge for worker with the mean income.
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Table 3: Quantity Effect - Impact of Taxes on Corporate Investment
Dep. Variable: Log Fixed Asset Investment, Panel 2000–2006
Model Fixed Effects Model GMM Model
Explanat. Var.: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Lag Log Fixed Assets .377∗∗∗ .344∗∗∗ .384∗∗∗ .384∗∗∗
(.064) ( .066) (.059) (.060)
Stat. Corporate Tax -1.584∗∗∗ -1.452∗∗∗ -1.449∗∗∗ -1.180∗∗∗ -1.097∗∗∗ -1.122∗∗∗
( .222) (.221) (.225) (.159) (.158) (.161)
EMTR -1.882∗∗∗ -1.500∗∗∗
(.315) (.238)
Log GDP pC .949∗∗∗ 1.023∗∗∗ 1.351∗∗∗ .546∗∗∗ .550∗∗∗ .656∗∗∗
(.102) (.104) (.104) (.091) (.092) (.096)
Log GDP .073 .061 .033 .020 .020 .021
(.048) (.049) (.037) (.020) (.022) (.020)
Corruption -.185∗∗∗ -.183 -.027 -.120 -.123∗∗∗ -.069
(.067) (.069) (.070) (.051) (.054) (.055)
Unemp. Rate -.599∗ -.750∗∗ -.178 .163 .063 .053
(.353) (.359) (.370) (.285) (.029) (.293)
PV Capital Allowances .004 .417
(.367) (.304)
Year D.
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Industry-Year D.
√ √ √ √
Sargan/Hansen – – – – 0.811 0.770 0.762 0.875
AR(2) Test – – – – 0.328 0.286 0.666 0.777
# Obs. 101,059 101,059 100,697 95,509 66,452 66,335 66,148 62,656
# Firms 26,473 26,473 26,332 25,060 19,421 19,412 19,338 18,265
R2 Within 0.1217 0.1255 0.1301 0.1328 – – – –
Notes:
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for firm clusters in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates sig-
nificance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. The observational units are multinational affiliates per sample year. All
regressions include a full set of firm fixed effects. The dependent variable is the logarithm of a affiliates’s fixed
asset investment. In specifications (1) to (4) a fixed effect model is estimated while specifications (5) to (8)
estimate a dynamic first difference GMM model as proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). Sargan/Hansen
indicates the p-value of the Sargan-Hansen overidentification test. AR(2) Test depicts the p-value for the test
of second order autocorrelation. Lag Log Fixed Assets depicts the first lag of the dependent variable, i.e. the
logarithm of the affiliate’s fixed assets. Stat. Corporate Tax stands for the host country’s statutory corporate
tax rate and EMTR for its effective marginal tax rate. Log GDP and Log GDP pC indicate the logarithm of
the host country’s gross domestic product and gross domestic product per captita. Corruption is an index for
the host country’s corruption level, Unemp. Rate stands for the unemployment rate, PV Capital Allowances
for the present value of capital allowances for corporate taxation, Year D. for a full set of year dummies and
Industry-Year D. for a full set of two-digit industry-year dummies.
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Table 4a: Quality Effect - Impact of Taxes on Investment Profitability
Dep. Variable: Log of Pre-tax Profitability, Panel 2000–2006
Dep. Variable Pre-tax Profit per Total Assets Pre-tax Profit per Fixed Assets
Explanat. Var.: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Corporate Tax Rate -1.247∗∗∗ -1.104∗∗∗ -1.163∗∗∗ -1.252∗∗∗ -1.347∗∗∗ -1.237∗∗∗ -1.272∗∗∗
(.260) (.262) (.263) (.283) (.496) (.296) (.489)
Log GDP p. C. .410∗∗∗ .367∗∗ .380∗∗ .506 .341∗ -.097
(.181) (.180) (.164) (1.259) (.179) (1.225)
Log GDP -.290∗∗∗ -.285∗∗ -.226∗∗ -.731 -.219 -.262
(.135) (.133) (.108) (1.232) (.121) (1.199)
Corruption Index .111 .126 .093 .240 .022 .126
(.088) (.090) (.094) (.203) (.098) (.200)
Unempl. Rate 2.625∗∗∗ 2.523∗∗∗ 3.297∗∗∗ 2.129∗∗∗ 3.564∗∗∗ 2.699∗∗∗
(.418) (.422) (.443) (.839) (.472) (.815)
Log Labour Intensity .142∗∗∗ .408∗ .137∗∗∗ 1.061∗∗∗
(.008) (.216) (.016) (.209)
Log Sales .210∗∗∗ -1.106∗∗∗ .818∗∗∗ -.872∗∗∗
(.014) (.292) (.010) (.285)
Year D.
√ √ √ √ √ √ √
Industry-Year D.
√ √ √ √ √
Model FE FE FE FE IV FE IV
Sargan/Hansen – – – – 0.176 – 0.173
Kleinbergen/Paap – – – – 0.000 – 0.000
# Observations 101,059 101,059 100,697 88,776 31,244 88,776 31,245
# Firms 26,473 26,473 26,332 23,046 12,091 23,046 12,091
R2 Within 0.0053 0.0063 0.0073 0.0313 – 0.2568 –
Notes:
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for firm clusters in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates signif-
icance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. The observational unit is the multinational affiliate per sample year. The
dependent variable is the logarithm of the affiliate’s pre-tax profits per total assets (fixed assets) in Spec-
ifications (1) to (5) (in Specifications (6) to (7)). In Specifications (1)-(4) and (6) a fixed effect model is
estimated while Specifications (5) and (7) estimate a first difference model which accounts for the potential
reverse causality between affiliate profitability and fixed asset investment and employment intensity by using
an instrumental variable approach. Sargan/Hansen depicts the p-value of the Sargan/Hansen overidentification
test. Kleinbergen-Paap stands for the Kleinbergen-Paap Statistic which tests the revelevance of the instrument
set employed. Stat. Corporate Tax stands for the host country’s statutory corporate tax rate and EMTR
for its effective marginal tax rate. Log GDP and Log GDP pC indicate the logarithm of the host country’s
gross domestic product and gross domestic product per captita. Corruption is an index for the host country’s
corruption level, Unemp. Rate stands for the unemployment rate, PV Capital Allowances for the present value
of capital allowances for corporate taxation, Year D. for a full set of year dummies and Industry-Year D. for a
full set of two-digit industry-year dummies. Moreover, Log Labour Intensity depicts the logarithm of the labour
intensity as measured by the logarithm of the payroll sum over fixed assets and Log Sales is the logarithm of
the affiliate’s sales which proxies for the firm’s size.
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Table 4b: Quality Effect - Impact of Taxes on Investment Profitability
Dep. Variable: Log of Pre-tax Profitability, Panel 2000–2006
Dep. Variable Pre-tax Profit per Total Assets Pre-tax Profit per Fixed Assets
Explanat. Var.: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Tax Differential -.927∗∗∗ -.853∗∗∗ -.863∗∗∗ -.760∗∗∗ -1.115∗∗∗ -.768∗∗∗ -1.109∗∗∗
( .179) (.179) (.179) (.189) (.361) (.198) (.362)
Log GDP p. C. .537∗∗∗ .493∗∗∗ .470∗∗ 2.149 .510∗∗∗ 1.521
(.181) (.185) (.175) (1.341) (.188) (1.350)
Log GDP -.314∗∗∗ -.308∗∗ -.253∗∗ -1.960 -.243∗∗ -1.401
(.138) (.133) (.114) (1.275) (.124) (1.284)
Corruption Index .175 .189 .167 .315 .125 .256
(.093) (.094) (.099) (.204) (.102) (.204)
Unempl. Rate 2.755∗∗∗ 2.635∗∗∗ 3.337∗∗∗ 2.674∗∗∗ 3.646∗∗∗ 3.137∗∗∗
(.444) (.448) (.471) (.897) (.501) (.898)
Log Labour Intensity .207∗∗∗ .590∗∗∗ .801∗∗∗ 1.272∗∗∗
(.015) (.230) (.011) (.229)
Log Sales .211∗∗∗ -.684∗∗ .135∗∗∗ -.570∗
(.014) (.314) (.017) (.316)
Year D.
√ √ √ √ √ √ √
Industry-Year D.
√ √ √ √ √
Model FE FE FE FE IV FE IV
Sargan/Hansen – – – – 0.5204 – –
Kleinbergen/Paap – – – – 0.000 – –
# Observations 86,623 86,623 86,297 76,076 25,519 76,076 25,520
# Firms 22,114 22,114 21,992 19,202 9,603 19,202 9,603
R2 Within 0.0056 0.0069 0.0082 0.0307 – 0.2434 –
Notes:
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for firm clusters in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates signif-
icance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. The observational unit is the multinational affiliate per sample year. The
dependent variable is the logarithm of the affiliate’s pre-tax profits per total assets (fixed assets) in Spec-
ifications (1) to (5) (in Specifications (6) to (7)). In Specifications (1)-(4) and (6) a fixed effect model is
estimated while Specifications (5) and (7) estimate a first difference model which accounts for the potential
reverse causality between affiliate profitability and fixed asset investment and employment intensity by using
an instrumental variable approach. Sargan/Hansen depicts the p-value of the Sargan/Hansen overidentification
test. Kleinbergen-Paap stands for the Kleinbergen-Paap Statistic which tests the revelevance of the instrument
set employed. Tax Differential stands for the unweighted average difference between the host country’s statu-
tory corporate tax rate and the statutory corporate tax rate of other firms within the multinational group.
EMTR is the affiliate’s effective marginal tax rate. Log GDP and Log GDP pC indicate the logarithm of the
host country’s gross domestic product and gross domestic product per captita. Corruption is an index for
the host country’s corruption level, Unemp. Rate stands for the unemployment rate, PV Capital Allowances
for the present value of capital allowances for corporate taxation, Year D. for a full set of year dummies and
Industry-Year D. for a full set of two-digit industry-year dummies. Moreover, Log Labour Intensity depicts the
logarithm of the labour intensity as measured by the logarithm of the payroll sum over fixed assets and Log
Sales is the logarithm of the affiliate’s sales which proxies for the firm’s size.
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Table 5a: Quality Effect - Impact of Taxes on Labour Intensity
Dep. Variable: Log Labour Intensity, Panel 2000–2006
Model Fixed Effects Model GMM Model
Explanat. Var.: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Lag Labour Int. .409∗∗∗ .303∗∗∗
(.065) (.068)
Corporate Tax Rate 1.630∗∗∗ 1.649∗∗∗ 1.566∗∗∗ 1.675∗∗∗ 1.556∗∗∗ 1.679∗∗∗ 1.584∗∗∗
(.230) (.230) (.230) (.239) (.199) (.203) (.232)
Log GDP per Capita -.428∗∗∗ -.519∗∗∗ -.589∗∗∗ -.448∗∗∗ -.590∗∗∗ -.666∗∗∗
(.108) (.110) (.112) (.108) (.106) (.156)
Log GDP -.067 -.058 -.057 .013 .009 .030∗∗
(.052) (.054) (.054) (.069) (.014) (.017)
Corruption Index .344∗∗∗ .341∗∗∗ .420 .130 .819∗∗∗ .674∗∗∗
(.075) (.076) (.078) (.062) (.080) (.193)
Unempl. Rate .931∗∗∗ .836∗∗ .554 -1.345∗∗∗ .061 -.296
(.378) (.379) (.385) (.313) (.330) (.340)
Labour Tax Rate -.013 -.053 .102 .176∗
(.104) (.088) (.098) (.096)
PV Capital Allowances -.239 -.986∗∗∗ 1.127∗∗ .735
(.428) (.304) (.468) (.494)
Log Sales .083 .080∗∗∗ .190∗∗∗ .325∗∗∗
(.019) (.016) (.057) (.096)
Log Wage -.718∗∗∗ -.232
(.020) (.234)
Log Pre-tax Profitability .286∗∗∗ .089∗∗
(.005) (.042)
Year D.
√ √ √ √ √ √ √
Industry-Year D.
√ √ √ √ √
AR(2) 0.120 0.419
Sargan/Hansen 0.794 0.643
# Observations 101,059 101,059 101,059 92,241 88,776 61,086 50,894
# Firms 26,473 26,473 26,473 24,034 23,046 17,735 15,389
R2 Within 0.0638 0.0654 0.0689 0.0786 0.3904 – –
Notes:
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for firm clusters in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates significance at
the 10%, 5%, 1% level. The observational unit is the multinational affiliate per sample year. The dependent variable is
the logarithm of the affiliate’s labour-to-fixed asset-ratio. In specifications (1) to (5) a fixed effect model is estimated
while specifications (6) to (7) estimate a dynamic first difference GMM model as proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991).
Sargan/Hansen indicates the p-value of the Sargan-Hansen overidentification test. AR(2) depicts the p-value for the
test of second order autocorrelation. Stat. Corporate Tax stands for the host country’s statutory corporate tax rate and
EMTR for its effective marginal tax rate. Log GDP and Log GDP pC indicate the logarithm of the host country’s gross
domestic product and gross domestic product per captita. Corruption is an index for the host country’s corruption level,
Unemp. Rate stands for the unemployment rate, PV Capital Allowances for the present value of capital allowances for
corporate taxation, Labour Tax Rate for the labour tax wedge of a person who earns the median country income, Year
D. for a full set of year dummies and Industry-Year D. for a full set of two-digit industry-year dummies. Moreover, Log
Sales is the logarithm of the affiliate’s sales which proxies for the firm’s size, Log Wage is the logarithm of the average
affiliate worker’s yearly wage rate and Log Pre-tax Profitability is the logarithm of the affiliate’s pre-tax profitability as
measured by pre-tax profits over fixed assets.
Table 5b: Quality Effect - Impact of Taxes on Labour Intensity
Dep. Variable: Labour Intensity, Panel 2000–2006
Model Fixed Effects Model GMM Model
Explanat. Var.: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Lag Labour Int. .223∗∗∗ .244∗∗∗
(.103) (.064)
Tax Differential .227 .304∗∗ .301∗∗ .416∗∗∗ .404∗∗∗ .452∗∗∗ .432∗∗∗
(.147) (.146) (.147) (.151) (.124) (.119) (.122)
Log GDP per Capita -.372∗∗∗ -.475∗∗∗ -.543∗∗∗ -.425∗∗∗ -.739∗∗∗ -.710∗∗∗
(.107) (.109) (.111) (.107) (.109) (.158)
Log GDP -.030 -.019 -.019 .040 .015 .042∗∗
(.040) (.045) (.044) (.063) (.012) (.020)
Corruption Index .284∗∗∗ .295∗∗∗ .395∗∗∗ .069 .794∗∗∗ .637∗∗∗
(.077) (.078) (.079) (.064) (.078) (.189)
Unempl. Rate 1.139∗∗∗ 1.079∗∗ .885∗∗∗ -1.154∗∗∗ -.079 -.672∗
(.403) (.404) (.409) (.333) (.334) (.350)
Labour Tax Rate -.144 -.088 .079 .184∗∗
(.107) (.090) (.093) (.093)
PV Capital Allowances .315 -.401 .761 .514
(.431) (.309) (.447) (.450)
Log Sales .112∗∗∗ .107∗∗∗ .250∗∗∗ .323∗∗∗
(.021) (.018) (.052) (.099)
Log Wage -.737∗∗∗ -.265
(.022) (.228)
Profitability .274∗∗∗ .153∗∗∗
(.005) (.041)
Year D.
√ √ √ √ √ √ √
Industry-Year D.
√ √ √ √ √
AR(2) – – – – – 0.448 0.277
Sargan/Hansen – – – – – 0.605 0.206
# Observations 86,623 86,623 86,297 78,960 76,076 53,041 44,424
# Firms 22,114 22,114 21,992 19,999 19,202 15,155 13,235
R2 Within 0.0736 0.0749 0.0791 0.0929 0.3984 – –
Notes:
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for firm clusters in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates significance at
the 10%, 5%, 1% level. The observational unit is the multinational affiliate per sample year. The dependent variable is
the logarithm of the affiliate’s labour-to-fixed asset-ratio. In specifications (1) to (5) a fixed effect model is estimated
while specifications (6) to (7) estimate a dynamic first difference GMM model as proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991).
Sargan/Hansen indicates the p-value of the Sargan-Hansen overidentification test. AR(2) depicts the p-value for the
test of second order autocorrelation. Tax Differential stands for the unweighted average difference between the host
country’s statutory corporate tax rate and the statutory corporate tax rate of other firms within the multinational
group. Log GDP and Log GDP pC indicate the logarithm of the host country’s gross domestic product and gross
domestic product per captita. Corruption is an index for the host country’s corruption level, Unemp. Rate stands
for the unemployment rate, PV Capital Allowances for the present value of capital allowances for corporate taxation,
Labour Tax Rate for the labour tax wedge of a person who earns the median country income, Year D. for a full set of year
dummies and Industry-Year D. for a full set of two-digit industry-year dummies. Moreover, Log Sales is the logarithm
of the affiliate’s sales which proxies for the firm’s size, Log Wage is the logarithm of the average affiliate worker’s yearly
wage rate and Log Pre-tax Profitability is the logarithm of the affiliate’s pre-tax profitability as measured by pre-tax
profits over fixed assets.
Table 6a: Quality Effect - Impact of Taxes on Payroll Intensity
Dep. Variable: Log Payroll Intensity, Panel 2000–2006
Model Fixed Effects Model GMM Model
Explanat. Var.: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Lag Payroll Int. .376∗∗∗ .313∗∗∗
(.088) (.091)
Corporate Tax Rate 1.207∗∗∗ 1.195∗∗∗ 1.091∗∗∗ 1.300∗∗∗ 1.436∗∗∗ .658∗∗∗ .730∗∗∗
(.226) (.225) (.225) (.236) (.200) (.196) (.238)
Log GDP per Capita -.037 -.120 -.309∗∗∗ -.367∗∗∗ -.245∗∗∗ -.160∗∗∗
(.114) (.115) (.117) (.109) (.100) (.128)
Log GDP -.075 -.069 -.071 .010 -.029 -.024
(.065) (.066) (.066) (.070) (.021) (.035)
Corruption Index .0042 .008 .051 .017 .114∗∗ .057
(.069) (.070) (.072) (.062) (.059) (.058)
Unempl. Rate -.412 -.560 -.710∗ -1.648∗∗∗ -.491 -.543
(.362) (.362) (.371) (.316) (.333) (.330)
Labour Tax Rate -.024 -.076 .062 .087
(.103) (.090) (.098) (.099)
PV Capital Allowances -.468 -1.048∗∗∗ -.110 -.139
(.351) (.298) (.331) (.348)
Log Sales .198∗∗∗ .110∗∗∗ .401∗∗∗ .257∗∗
(.017) (.016) (.049) (.120)
Log Pre-tax Profitability .287∗∗∗ .068
(.005) (.052)
Year D.
√ √ √ √ √ √ √
Industry-Year D.
√ √ √ √ √
AR(2) 0.530 0.870
Sargan/Hansen 0.188 0.581
# Observations 95,636 95,636 95,296 88,074 88,074 58,370 50,350
# Firms 24,925 24,925 24,797 22,901 22,901 17,061 15,268
R2 Within 0.0072 0.0072 0.0111 0.0305 0.2595 – –
Notes:
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for firm clusters in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates significance at
the 10%, 5%, 1% level. The observational unit is the multinational affiliate per sample year. The dependent variable is
the logarithm of the affiliate’s payroll-to-fixed asset-ratio. In specifications (1) to (5) a fixed effect model is estimated
while specifications (6) to (7) estimate a dynamic first difference GMM model as proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991).
Sargan/Hansen indicates the p-value of the Sargan-Hansen overidentification test. AR(2) depicts the p-value for the
test of second order autocorrelation. Stat. Corporate Tax stands for the host country’s statutory corporate tax rate and
EMTR for its effective marginal tax rate. Log GDP and Log GDP pC indicate the logarithm of the host country’s gross
domestic product and gross domestic product per captita. Corruption is an index for the host country’s corruption level,
Unemp. Rate stands for the unemployment rate, PV Capital Allowances for the present value of capital allowances for
corporate taxation, Labour Tax Rate for the labour tax wedge of a person who earns the median country income, Year
D. for a full set of year dummies and Industry-Year D. for a full set of two-digit industry-year dummies. Moreover,
Log Sales is the logarithm of the affiliate’s sales which proxies for the firm’s size and Log Pre-tax Profitability is the
logarithm of the affiliate’s pre-tax profitability as measured by pre-tax profits over fixed assets.
Table 6b: Quality Effect - Impact of Taxes on Payroll Intensity
Dep. Variable: Payroll Intensity, Panel 2000–2006
Model Fixed Effects Model GMM Model
Explanat. Var.: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Lag Payroll Int. .284∗∗∗ .353∗∗∗
(.094) (.105)
Tax Differential .026 .026 .022 .136 .352∗∗∗ .199 .306∗∗
(.138) (.138) (.139) (.144) (.125) (.124) (.132)
Log GDP per Capita .054 -.040 -.226∗∗ -.344∗∗∗ -.159 .024
(.113) (.114) (.115) (.109) (.135) (.128)
Log GDP -.048 -.045 -.044 .034 -.012 -.006
(.054) (.056) (.054) (.063) (.023) (.012)
Corruption Index -.059 -.042 .018 -.035 .065 .014
(.073) (.074) (.075) (.065) (.059) (.067)
Unempl. Rate -.267 -.395 -.488 -1.454∗∗∗ -.827∗∗ -.260
(.384) (.384) (.392) (.335) (.349) (.362)
Labour Tax Rate -.102 -.100 .114 .054
(.106) (.092) (.102) (.166)
PV Capital Allowances .161 -.463 -.068 -.144
(.358) (.304) (.353) (.308)
Log Sales .221∗∗∗ .132∗∗∗ .273∗∗ .169∗
(.018) (.017) (.120) (.101)
Profitability .275∗∗∗ .118∗∗ .138∗
(.005) (.054) (.072)
Year D.
√ √ √ √ √ √ √
Industry-Year D.
√ √ √ √ √
AR(2) – – – – – 0.976 0.909
Sargan/Hansen – – – – – 0.434 0.217
# Observations 82,143 82,143 81,831 75,525 75,525 43,992 23,967
# Firms 20,843 20,843 20,730 19,081 19,081 13,146 7,067
R2 Within 0.0038 0.0038 0.0080 0.0330 0.2480 – –
Notes:
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for firm clusters in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates significance at
the 10%, 5%, 1% level. The observational unit is the multinational affiliate per sample year. The dependent variable is
the logarithm of the affiliate’s labour-to-fixed asset-ratio. In specifications (1) to (5) a fixed effect model is estimated
while specifications (6) to (7) estimate a dynamic first difference GMM model as proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991).
Sargan/Hansen indicates the p-value of the Sargan-Hansen overidentification test. AR(2) depicts the p-value for the
test of second order autocorrelation. Tax Differential stands for the unweighted average difference between the host
country’s statutory corporate tax rate and the statutory corporate tax rate of other firms within the multinational
group. Log GDP and Log GDP pC indicate the logarithm of the host country’s gross domestic product and gross
domestic product per captita. Corruption is an index for the host country’s corruption level, Unemp. Rate stands
for the unemployment rate, PV Capital Allowances for the present value of capital allowances for corporate taxation,
Labour Tax Rate for the labour tax wedge of a person who earns the median country income, Year D. for a full set
of year dummies and Industry-Year D. for a full set of two-digit industry-year dummies. Moreover, Log Sales is the
logarithm of the affiliate’s sales which proxies for the firm’s size and Log Pre-tax Profitability is the logarithm of the
affiliate’s pre-tax profitability as measured by pre-tax profits over fixed assets.
Table 7: Wage Effect - Impact of Taxes on the Average Wage
Dep. Variable: Average Yearly Wage, Panel 2000–2006
Explanat. Var.: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lag Avg. Yearly Wage .139
(.095)
Tax Rate -.257∗∗ -.549∗∗∗ -.548∗∗∗ -.489∗∗∗ -.443∗∗∗ -.661∗∗∗
(.122) (.115) (.116) (.117) (.103) (.215)
Log GDP per Capita .362∗∗∗ .379∗∗∗ .275∗∗∗ .234∗∗∗ .666∗∗∗
(.052) (.052) (.052) (.052) (.097)
Log GDP -.016 -.019 -.019 -.021 -.037∗∗
(.018) (.018) (.018) (.022) (.017)
Corruption Index -.375 -.372 -.381∗∗∗ -.324 -.653∗∗∗
(.035) (.035) (0.036) (.034) (.059)
Unempl. Rate -1.229∗∗∗ -1.246∗∗∗ -1.131∗∗∗ -1.271∗∗∗ .011
(.147) (.149) (.152) (.142) (.193)
Labour Tax Rate -.102∗∗ -.098∗∗ .114
(.046) (.044) (.102)
Log Sales .111∗∗∗ .106∗∗∗ .018
(.009) (.009) (.137)
Log Labour Productivity .067∗∗∗ .072
(.003) (.048)
Year D.
√ √ √ √ √ √
Industry-Year D.
√ √ √ √
AR(2) – – – – – 0.748
Sargan/Hansen – – – – – 0.444
# Observations 95,636 95,636 95,296 88,074 82,133 51,709
# Firms 24,925 24,925 24,797 22,901 21,822 15,341
R2 Within 0.3966 0.4020 0.4031 0.4314 0.4784 –
Notes:
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for firm clusters in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates significance at
the 10%, 5%, 1% level. The observational unit is the multinational affiliate per sample year. The dependent variable is
the logarithm of the yearly wage cost for the average affiliate worker. In specifications (1) to (5) a fixed effect model is
estimated while specification (6) estimates a dynamic first difference GMM model as proposed by Arellano and Bond
(1991). Sargan/Hansen indicates the p-value of the Sargan-Hansen overidentification test. AR(2) depicts the p-value
for the test of second order autocorrelation. Stat. Corporate Tax stands for the host country’s statutory corporate
tax rate and EMTR for its effective marginal tax rate. Log GDP and Log GDP pC indicate the logarithm of the host
country’s gross domestic product and gross domestic product per captita. Corruption is an index for the host country’s
corruption level, Unemp. Rate stands for the unemployment rate, Labour Tax Rate for the labour tax wedge of a person
who earns the median country income, Year D. for a full set of year dummies and Industry-Year D. for a full set of
two-digit industry-year dummies. Moreover, Log Sales is the logarithm of the affiliate’s sales which proxies for the firm’s
size and Log Labour Productivity is the logarithm of the affiliate’s labour productivity as measured by earnings before
interest and tax over the number of employees.
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